Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Volume 1
1996

Can Minority Voting Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson
Laughlin McDonald
ACLU Foundation

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Election Law Commons, Fourteenth
Amendment Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Law and Race Commons

Recommended Citation
Laughlin McDonald, Can Minority Voting Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol1/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Race and Law by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

CAN MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS SURVIVE
MILLER v. JOHNSON?
Laughlin McDonald*
INTRODUCTION

In Miller v. Johnson' a sharply divided Court invalidated Georgia's majority-Black Eleventh Congressional District on the ground
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court held first that the State's plan was a constitutionally suspect racial classification because "race was the
predominant factor in drawing . . . [the] Eleventh District" and the
State "subordinated to racial objectives" its traditional districting
principles.3 Then, applying strict scrutiny, the "most rigorous and
exacting standard of constitutional review,"4 the Court concluded
that the Eleventh District was not drawn to promote a compelling
state interest. 5 The Court had no occasion to address the issue of
.narrow tailoring because the State's plan "was not required by the
Voting Rights Act under a correct reading of the statute."6
Although Miller is a confusing decision and obscures the law
surrounding redistricting, it is widely perceived as casting doubt on
the constitutionality of all majority-minority districts.7 More omi-

* Director, Southern Regional Office, ACLU Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia.
B.A. 1960, Columbia University; LL.B. 1965, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
2. Id. at 2488-94. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor wrote a
decisive concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg dissented and was joined in whole or in
part by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Stevens wrote in a separate
dissenting opinion that he believed the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had
suffered no dilution of their voting strength nor any other legally cognizable injury. Id.
at 2497. In Shaw v. Reno, a case involving an earlier and similar constitutional challenge
to congressional redistricting in North Carolina, the Court was similarly divided, with
Justice O'Connor once again casting the deciding fifth vote. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
2816 (1993).
3. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
4. Id. at 2490.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2491.
7. Such was the view of the three-judge court in Lopez v. Monterey County, which
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nously, Miller calls into question the present Court's basic commitment to continued enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
Part I of this Article reviews the congressional redistricting
process in Georgia, particularly the State's efforts to comply with the
Voting Rights Act and avoid the dilution of minority voting
strength. Part IIdescribes the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge and
the State's asserted defenses, or more accurately its lack of asserted
defenses. Part I argues that the decision of the majority rests upon
wholly false assumptions about the colorblindness of the political
process and the harm caused by remedial redistricting. Part IV notes
the expansion in Miller of the cause of action first recognized in Shaw
v. Reno. Part V comments on the lack of clear, fair standards in Miller
and how that will impact upon legislative decision making and
litigation. Part VI discusses the negative impact of the decision,
which allows, for the first time, local federal district courts directly
to review the preclearance decisions of the Attorney General on the
administration of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.8 Part VII argues
that Miller has the potential for purging substantial numbers of
minorities from elected office in the South and wiping out many of
the gains so painstakingly won under the Voting Rights Act over the
last thirty years.
I. CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN GEORGIA: TRYING TO COMPLY WITH THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT

As a result of the 1990 census, Georgia's congressional delegation increased from ten to eleven members.9 Only one of the
preexisting districts, the Fifth, had been majority Black. It was also
the only district represented by an African American, John Lewis,'0
despite the fact that African Americans were twenty-seven percent
of the population of the state."
At the beginning of the 1990s redistricting process, state officials
agreed to submit a plan that would increase the number of majorityBlack congressional districts from one to two. The adoption of that
stated that "Miller raises substantial doubt as to whether legislative division into race
based districts or election areas can ever withstand constitutional scrutiny." Lopez v.
Monterey County, No. C-91-20559-RMW, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1995). At least
one commentator has expressed a similar, or more extreme, view. See, e.g., Cindi Ross
Scoppe, Race-Based DistrictsIllegal,STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 29,1995, at Al.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
9. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
10. See JOINT CrR. FOR POuTICAL AND EcONOMIc STuDIES PRESS, BLAcK ELECTED
OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER 131 (1990).

11. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at2483.
12. Id. at 2483; Trial Transcript, vol. I, at 37-38, 69, 123, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.
Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (No. 194-008) [hereinafter Trans.], aff'd Miller v. Johnson, 115
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goal was due in large measure to the increased number of Blacks
serving in the General Assembly and their advocacy of greater racial
fairness in congressional redistricting."
The State also believed that it had an obligation under the
Voting Rights Act to avoid diluting minority voting strength. Both
houses, for example, adopted redistricting guidelines in 1991 which
included: complying with the one person, one vote rule, using single
member districts only, drawing districts that were contiguous,
avoiding the dilution of minority voting strength-complying with
sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act; maintaining the integrity
of political subdivisions where possible,4 protecting incumbents, and
preserving the core of existing districts.'
A. The Importance of Section 2
Section 2 provides that a challenged practice is unlawful if it
"results" in minority voters having "less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice."" In Thornburg v. Gingles, the
Court held that "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral
law, practice, or structure, interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black
and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.' 7
The legislative history of section 2, particularly the 1982 Senate
report, indicates that "a variety of factors, depending upon the kind
of rule, practice, or procedure called into question," are relevant in
determining a violation.'8 After reviewing the factors discussed in
S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
13. Trans., supra note 12, at 124. Members of the General Assembly's Black Caucus
urged the creation of three majority-minority congressional districts. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2484; Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1360-61; Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV, at 101, 247-48; id.,
vol. El, at 234-35. The Black Caucus reasoned that because of racial bloc voting and the
history of past discrimination, three majority-minority districts were needed to provide
Blacks with equal electoral opportunities that were roughly proportional to the Black
percentage of the State's population. Id., vol. IV, at 228.
14. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483; Joint Appendix at 65-77, Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct.
2475 (1995) (No. 94-797) [hereinafter Jt. App.].
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994). The "results" standard was added to section 2 by
Congress in 1982 in response to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment violation). Section 2 made clear that proof of intentional
discrimination was not required for a statutory violation. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30,43-44 & n.8 (1986).
16. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

17. Id. at 47.
18. S. REP. NO. 417,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982). Typical factors identified in the
Senate report include: the extent of any history of discrimination in the jurisdiction that
touched the right of the members of the minority group to participate in the democratic
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the Senate report, the Court in Gingles identified three preconditions
for a section 2 challenge to a multimember legislative redistricting
plan: (1) whether the minority group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more
single member districts; (2) whether the minority group is politically
cohesive, i.e., votes as a bloc; and (3) whether the majority also votes
as a bloc "usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."19
Ultimately, section 2 "requires the court's overall judgment, based
on the totality of circumstances and guided by those relevant factors
in the particular case, of whether the voting strength of minority
voters is... 'minimized or canceled out." '20
The State's concern over section 2 was far from merely
academic. Between 1974 and 1990, section 2 vote dilution lawsuits
were filed against forty cities and fifty-seven counties in Georgia
challenging their at-large systems of elections. 2' As a result of the
litigation, all but one of the cities, and fifty-three of the counties,
changed to district systems containing majority Black districts.2 The
number of Black elected officials in the State grew from three in 1964
to approximately 500 in 1900, the majority (eighty-eight percent) of
whom were elected to city and county offices. This increase can be
traced directly to the gradual demise of at-large elections and the
increased use of districts containing effective Black-voting
majorities. 24
process; the extent to which voting is racially polarized; the extent to which the
jurisdiction has used devices that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination, such
as majority vote requirements or anti-single shot provisions; whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to existing candidate slating processes; the
extent to which members of the minority group bear the effects of discrimination in
such areas as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process; whether political campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and the extent to which members of the
minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. See id.
19. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
20. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 18, at 29 n.118. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct.
2647, 2656-57 (1994) ("the ultimate conclusions about equality or inequality of
opportunity were intended by Congress to be judgments resting on comprehensive, not
limited, canvassing of relevant facts").
21. Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIE REVOLUrION IN THE SOurH: THE
IMPACr OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, at 81 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard
Grofman eds., 1994).
22. Id. at 100. Most (but not all) of the cases were unreported consent decrees. E.g.,
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Carrolton Branch NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d
1547 (11th Cir. 1987); Bailey v. Vining, 514 F. Supp. 452 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Paige v. Gray,
437 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Pitts v. Busbee, 395 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
23. McDonald et al., supra note 21, at 89; JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
STUDIES, NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALs 10, 129,(1990).

24. McDonald et al., supra, note 21, at 89-90; Charles S. Bullock, H, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, DistrictingFormats, and the Election of African Americans, 56 J. POL.
1098,1103-04 (1994).
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As it began redistricting in 1991, the State was aware not just of
the requirements of section 2, but also the fact that majority-minority
districts were generally necessary to provide Blacks a realistic
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. In its brief to the
Supreme Court, the State acknowledged that other than Andrew
Young in 1972 "[iun the 500 or so other congressional elections held
in Georgia over the past century, no black candidate has ever won in
a majority white district..... "Surely," the State argued, "the General
Assembly was entitled to assume, as a simple empirical matter, that
this compelling historical pattern was likely to continue in the
immediate future." 26 In enacting congressional redistricting, therefore, the State had an obvious incentive to adopt a non-dilutive plan
and insulate itself from a possible section 2 vote dilution challenge.
B. The State's PriorFailures to Comply with Section 5
As concerned as it was with section 2, the State was even more
concerned with complying with section 5. Section 5 requires
"covered" jurisdictions, such as Georgia, to submit their proposed
changes in voting to the United States Attorney General or to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
preclearance.2 Whether preclearance is administrative or judicial,
the jurisdiction has the burden of proving that a proposed change

25. Brief for Appellants at 19, Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (No. 94-631)
(emphasis omitted).
26. Id. at 36.
27. Section 5 originally targeted southern states that had long histories of
discrimination against Blacks in registering and voting. See South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329-30 (1966). Following the Civil War these states
disenfranchised newly emancipated Blacks through intimidation and violence,
expulsion from office, and a variety of stratagems such as the literacy test, the poll tax,
and the all-White primary. For a discussion of the nineteenth century disenfranchisement movement and its tragic consequences for Blacks and for the nation as a
whole, see ERIC FONER, RECoNSrRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUrION (1988);
V.O. KEY, SOUrHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE
SHAPING OF SOUrHERN POLTICS (1974); PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS AND PARTY
(1965); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOurH (1971); Armand Derfner,
Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973); Laughlin

McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: The Continued
Need for Preclearance,51 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1983); Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting
Rights, 51 VA. L.REv. 1051 (1965). Section 5 was amended and extended in 1970, 1975,
and 1982, to include language minorities (defined as American Indians, Asian
Americans, Alaskan Natives, and persons of Spanish heritage). See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aala(e) (1994). Sixteen states, or parts of states, from New York to California are now
covered by section 5. 28 C.F.R. app. § 51 (1991). The statute is scheduled to expire in
2007.42 U.S.C. §§ 19731(c)(3), 1973b(a)(8) (1994).

Michigan Journalof Race & Law

[VOL. 1:119

does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect." One of the
purposes of section 5 was to prevent covered jurisdictions from
adopting new forms of discrimination to replace those, such as
literacy and good character tests for voting, invalidated by other
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.9 Virtually all voting changes
are subject to preclearance, including congressional redistricting
plans. 30
The State was particularly concerned with section 5 because all
of its prior congressional redistricting plans had run afoul of preclearance. Georgia's 1931 congressional reapportionment was invalidated in Wesberry v. Sanders,3" a 1964 case, on one person, one
vote grounds." The redistricting that followed, based on the 1970
census, was the first congressional redistricting in the State subject to
section 5 review.
The congressional plan initially passed by the State in 1971
discriminated against racial minorities in several ways and was
rejected by the Attorney General under section 5. The plan divided
the concentration of the Black population in the metropolitan
Atlanta area into the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts to ensure that
the Fifth District would be majority White. 3 The plan also moved
the residences of Blacks who were regarded as potential candidates
from the Fifth to the Sixth District, i.e., Atlanta Vice-Mayor Maynard
Jackson and Andrew Young, who had run for the Fifth District in
19 70 .3 The State drew another plan increasing the percentage of
Blacks in the Fifth District to forty-four percent and the plan was
precleared.31
The State's 1981 congressional plan was also rejected under
section 5 as the product of intentional discrimination. Based on the
1980 census, the 1971 plan was malapportioned. 6 All of the districts
were majority White, with the exception of the Fifth District which
was 50.3% Black based upon total population.37 The new 1982 plan
maintained White majorities in nine of the ten districts and

28. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 185 (1980).
29. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1976).
30. See Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 459 U.S. 1166 (1983);
Presley v. Etowah County Comms'n, 502 U.S. 491,501 (1992).
31. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
32. Id. at 7-8, 17-18.
33. Stipulations 11 170, 173, 180, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994)

[hereinafter Stip.]; Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 500.
34. Stip., supra note 33,91 172, 180; Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 500.
35. MICHAEL BARONE Er AL.,THE AuvMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 231-32 (1974).
36. Stip., supra note 33, 1 187 (explaining that the previously existing 1972 plan did
not satisfy the one person, one vote standard required by the Fourteenth Amendment).
37. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 498.
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increased the Black population in the Fifth to 57.3%.m While Blacks
were a majority (fifty-two percent) of the voting age population
(VAP) in the Fifth District, they were a minority (forty-six percent) of
registered voters.39 This plan, as did the 1971 plan, split the
concentrated Black population in the metropolitan Atlanta area into
three districts, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth, to minimize minority
voting strength4
The State submitted the plan for section 5 preclearance and the
Attorney General objected. The State then filed a declaratory
judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia,
which also denied preclearance.' The Senate had passed a
congressional plan containing a sixty-nine percent majority-Black
Fifth District,43 but the House rejected it." Joe Mack Wilson, Chair of
the House Reapportionment Committee-a person who played an
instrumental role in congressional redistricting-frankly explained
to his colleagues, "I don't want to draw nigger districts."' He
generally opposed legislation favorable to Blacks, which he referred
to contemptuously as "nigger legislation."'
The Speaker of the House, Thomas Murphy, was also opposed
to the Senate's Fifth District because he felt "we were gerrymandering a district to create a black district where a black would
certainly be elected."' 7 He "refused to appoint black persons to the
conference committee [to resolve the dispute between the House and
Senate] solely because they might support a plan which would allow
black voters, in one district, an opportunity to elect a candidate of
their choice. '' 8
The District Court for the District of Columbia concluded--on
the basis of "overt racial Statements, the conscious minimizing of
Black voting strength, historical discrimination and the absence of a
legitimate non-racial reason for adoption of the plan"-that the
State's submission had a discriminatory purpose in violation of
section 5. 9 The State submitted a remedial plan to the court that

38. Id.
39. Id. at 499.
40. Stip., supra note 33, 1

190-91, 195, 206, 234-35; Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 515.

41. Stip., supra note 33, 183.
42. Id. 186.
43. Id. 1 215.
44. Id. 11 216-18.
45. Busbee v Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D.D.C. 1982); Stip., supra note 33,1 199.
46. Stip., supra note 33, 1199; Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 500.
47. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 509-10.
48. Stip., supra note 33,1220; Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 510.
49. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 517. As for Joe Mack Wilson, the court concluded that he
"is a racist." Id. at 500.
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increased the Black VAP in the Fifth District to sixty percent, and
that plan was precleared." In deciding to add a second majorityBlack congressional district in 1991, the State was determined to
comply with section 5 and to avoid the embarrassment it had
experienced in 1982. s'
C. Drawing the Lines
The General Assembly held redistricting hearings throughout
the State in April, May, and August of 1991. At the first public
hearing in April, the Chairman of the Georgia Republican Party
submitted a plan creating a majority, fifty-nine percent Black district
extending from southern DeKalb County to Augusta. 2 That plan
was entered on the state's computer as LINDA.TEMPLATE, and
became the model for the Eleventh District. s3
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) prepared a plan for4
the Black Caucus that contained three majority-minority districts.
Entered on the state's computer as MCKINNEY.BMCCONGRESS, it
was also referred to as the "Max-Black" or "Max" plan."5 The plan
had broad support among Blacks, and was endorsed by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the
Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials, Concerned Black
Clergy, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."6
The General Assembly went into special session from August 19
to September 5, 1991, for the purpose of redistricting. Many
congressional plans were proposed and introduced during the
public hearings, the work sessions of the redistricting committees,
and the special session of the legislature. All the prososed plans
included one, two, or three majority-Black districts. The Black
Caucus plan was introduced in the House in committee and offered
as an amendment on the floor but was never adopted."

50. Stip., supra note 33,1 238; BARONE Er AL, supra note 35, at 289.
51. Bob Hanner, Chair of the House Reapportionment Committee, testified that "we
started off this process saying that we were going to meet the mandates of the Justice
Department, and the one person/one vote, and not have the purpose of effectively
diluting minority strength. And that was a positive thing the committee wanted to do."
Trans., supranote 12, vol. m, at 220.
52. Jt. App., supra note 14, at 82; Trans., supra note 12, vol. 11, at 153.
53. Trans., supra note 12, vol. II, at 16,20,153-54.
54. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
55. Id. (In spite of its name, the number of majority-Black districts (3 out of 11) was
roughly proportional to the percent (27%) of Black population in the state).
56. Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV, at 86,230,233.
57. Jt. App., supra note 14, at 13.
58. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1396-97 n.5 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (Edmondson, J.,
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1. The First Plan

The State submitted its first congressional redistricting plan to
the Department of Justice for preclearance under section 5 on
October 1, 1991. The plan contained two majority-minority districts
(the Fifth, 57.8% Black VAP, and the Eleventh, 56.6% Black VAP),
and a third district, the Second with 35.4% Black VAP 9 The Eleventh District in the first plan was not modeled after the Black Caucus
plan, but "almost exactly" after LINDA.TEMPLATEW
The Attorney General objected to the plan on January 21, 1992
on the grounds that: "elections in the State of Georgia are characterized by a pattern of racially polarized voting"; "the Georgia legislative leadership was predisposed to limit black voting potential to
two black majority districts"; the leadership did not make a good
faith attempt to "recognize the black voting potential of the large
concentration of minorities in southwest Georgia"; and, the State
had provided only pretextual reasons for failing to include in the
Eleventh District the minority population in Baldwin County.6
2. The Second Plan
After the section 5 objection, the reapportionment committees
and the General Assembly considered numerous other plans. 62 The
Senate passed a plan, REDRAW.SREDRAW2, containing three majority-Black districts and a change that increased the Black VAP in
the Eleventh District from 56.6% to 58.7%. Under the Senate plan,
the Eleventh District included concentrations of Black population in
southern Dekalb County, Augusta, and Savannah 3 The conference
committee rejected the Senate's plan."
The State enacted a second plan and submitted it for preclearance, again containing two majority Black districts (the Fifth,
57.5% Black VAP, and the Eleventh, 58% Black VAP) and a third
district, the Second, with 45% Black VAP.f Once again, the Eleventh

dissenting); Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV,at 230.
59. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483; Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 n.5 (S.D. Ga.
1994); Jt. App., supra note 14, at 14-15.
60. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2475; Trans., supra note 12, vol. 1, at 20, 153-54; Jt. App., supra
note 13, at 82.
61. Jt. App., supra note 14, at 99, 105-07; 115 S.Ct. at 2483-84.
62. Jt. App., supra note 14, at 17.
63. Id. at 62,98.
64. Trans., supra note 12, vol. III, at 212-13, 234.
65. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484; Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 n.9 (S.D. Ga.
1994); Jt. App., supra note 14, at 17-18, 54.
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District was modeled on LINDA.TEMPLATE, and included minority population from Baldwin County.6
The Attorney General objected to the second plan on March 20,
1992 on the grounds that: the State remained "predisposed to limit
Black voting potential to two Black majority voting age population
districts"; "alternatives including one adopted by the Senate
included a large number of Black voters from Screven, Effingham
and Chatham Counties in the 11th Congressional District";67 and the
State had provided "no legitimate reason" for its failure to include in
a majority-Black congressional district the second largest concentration of Blacks in the state.6
The State, with the memory of its 1981 redistricting still fresh in
its mind, decided not to seek judicial preclearance of its plan from
the District Court for the District of Columbia.6 According to the
State's chief legal advisor during redistricting, the chances of
winning judicial approval "were very much harmed by the Busbee
case, that we were in a similar situation because of the Senate's
action" in adopting a plan containing three majority Black districts.7
The Chair of the House Reapportionment Committee also thought
that the plan passed by the Senate would cause the court to reject the
State's first and second plans.7'
3. The Third Plan
The State of Georgia submitted a third plan to the Attorney
General containing three majority Black districts (the Fifth, 57.5%
Black VAP, the Eleventh, 60.4% Black VAP, and the Second, 52.3%
Black VAP) on April 1, 1992.7 Similar to the first and second plans,
the third plan maintained the southern DeKalb to Augusta core of
the Eleventh District. It also incorporated features of the Senate plan
(REDRAW.SREDRAW2) and included portions of Savannah in the
Eleventh District.? The plan was similar to the "Max-Black" plan
proposed by the Black Caucus in that it contained three majority-

66. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484; Trans., supra note 12, vol. 11, at 153-54; Jt. App., supra
note 14, at 82.
67. Another alternative plan relied on by the Department of Justice in denying
preclearance was the three-seat Black Caucus plan. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
68. Id. at 115 S. Ct. at 2484; Jt. App., supra note 14, at 120,124-26;
69. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
70. Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at 6.
71. Trans., supra note 12, vol. 11, at 246, 262.
72. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484; Jt. App., supra note 14, at 19-20,51-52.
73. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1394 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (Edmondson, J.,

dissenting).
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Black districts. But as Judge Edmondson found in his dissenting
opinion, the third plan was "significantly different in shape in many
ways"74 and was precleared on April 2, 1992.7'
II. THE CHALLENGE TO THE ELEVENTH DsTR'cr

The plaintiffs in Miller were White residents of the Eleventh
District, one of whom was an unsuccessful candidate in the 1992
Democratic primary for the Eleventh District. 76 He was defeated in a
runoff by Cynthia McKinney, an African American. The defendants
were various state officials, and two separate defendant
intervenors-the United States and a group of Black and White
residents of the district ("the Abrams intervenors").
By way of relief, the plaintiffs sought a reconfigured, i.e.,
bleached, Eleventh District in which a White would presumably
win. The plaintiffs, in a seemingly implicit concession that racial bloc
voting exists in the State, explained in their brief to the Supreme
Court that "Plaintiff DeLoach . . . lost the 1992 democratic
congressional runoff election to the current representative in the
Eleventh, and desires to run again without the outcome being
predetermined on the basis of race."7
The district court, in a two-to-one decision, held the Eleventh
District unconstitutional. A majority of the Supreme Court affirmed
the district court finding that "race was . . . the predominant,
overriding factor explaining the General Assembly's decision to
attach to the Eleventh District various appendages containing dense
majority-Black populations," and that as a result the district "cannot
be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny. " 7
The majority acknowledged that "[t]here is a 'significant State
interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination."' °

74. Id. at 1396-97 n.5.
75. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
76. The candidate, George DeLoach, claimed to be a resident of the Eleventh, but
was actually a resident of the Tenth District. Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008, slip. op. at
3 (S.D. Ga. June 14, 1994). The three-judge district court on remand denied without
explanation a motion to dismiss DeLoach for nonresidency in light of United States v.
Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2433 (1995), which held that plaintiffs who do not live in a
challenged district lack standing to complain of "racial gerrymandering." See Transcript
of Hearing at 4, Johnson v. Miller (S.D. Ga. Dec. 13,1995). (No. 194-008).
77. Brief for Appellees at 29 n.28, Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995) (No. 94631).
78. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. at 1393.
79. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2490. A map of the Eleventh District is included as Appendix
B to the Court's decision. Id. at 2496.
80. Id. at 2490 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993)). Justice Ginsburg,
in dissent, noted the agreement of the Court on a number of points, including that "to
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Georgia, however, refused to argue directly that it had a compelling
interest in drawing the Eleventh District as a majority-Black district
to eradicate the effects of past discrimination or to avoid a section 2
violation. The State was involved in other voting rights litigation
and did not want to make admissions in Miller that might damage
its position in the other cases." Accordingly, it equivocated over the
importance of race in redistricting.
The State acknowledged "Georgia's history of segregation" and
"that that history is related to some extent to the degree of82
segregation that exists as a matter of fact in Georgia politics today."
It also acknowledged, as noted above, the "simple empirical matter"
that majority-Black districts were necessary to provide minorities a
realistic opportunity for electionY But the State's bottom line in the
litigation was that "race may be considered, and was considered
here, simply to be sure that the resulting distribution of political
power was reasonably fair and representative of the State's
people." 8
The majority of the Court ignored even these concessions and
concluded that "the State's true interest in designing the Eleventh
District was creating a third majority-Black district to satisfy the
Justice Department's preclearance demands."" Those demands,
according to the majority, were based on the Attorney General's
unconstitutional "policy of maximizing majority-Black districts,"'
meet statutory requirements, state legislatures must sometimes consider race as a factor
highly relevant to the drawing of district lines." 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting).
81. See generally Georgia v. Reno, 881 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1995) (seeking a declaratory
judgment that the addition of new superior court judgeships after the effective date of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not constitute a violation under section 5); Brooks v.
State Bd. of Elections, 775 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (challenging under Section 2 the
circuit-wide method of electing superior court judges in Georgia); Brooks v. Miller, Civ.
No. 1:90-CV-1001-RCF (N.D. Ga. filed May 8, 1990) (challenging the State's majority
vote requirement under Section 2).
82. Brief for Appellants at 20, Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (No. 94-631).
83. Id. at 36.
84. Id.
85. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
86. Id. at 2492. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon the findings of
the district court which, in turn, relied heavily upon the hearsay statements of
Representative Tyrone Brooks made on the floor of the Georgia House during the
redistricting process. He stated that "the Attorney General... specifically told the states
covered by the Act that wherever possible, you must draw majority Black districts."
Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D. Ga. 1994). The best evidence of the
Attorney General's policy consists, not of third-party characterizations, but of the
regulations for the administration of section 5 and the statements of the Attorney
General herself.
The former make no mention of "maximization," see 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.51-51.61
(1991). The Attorney General's stated policy is that "[the Section 5 process is tailored to
the specifics of each case, and no general requirement of maximization-or of
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and, thus, did not provide the State a compelling interest in
adopting its redistricting plan.
Although the ultimate configuration of the Eleventh District
was clearly influenced by the objections of the Attorney General, the
State had a "true interest," which it announced at the very beginning
of the redistricting process, in creating the district as majority Black
to avoid minority vote dilution. The State's decision not to argue
that it had a compelling interest in eradicating the effects of past
discrimination or in complying with section 2 was made by its lawyers as a matter of litigation strategy. A majority of the Court erroneously conflated this post hoc legal posturing with the State's real
and admitted interest in not diluting minority voting strength."'
III. FALSE AssumroNs ABoUr COLOR BLNDNESS AND HARM

The greatest flaw in the majority's analysis in Miller is its refusal
to consider, or even to mention, the evidence of racial discrimination
in Georgia and its continuing effects, in the form of racial bloc
votingm As a consequence, the very premise upon which the
opinion rests-that the political process is colorblind-is entirely
false.
According to the majority, taking race into account in
redistricting harms individuals as well as society. Individuals are
harmed because of "the offensive and demeaning assumption that
voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
the polls."'
Society is allegedly harmed because "' [r]acial
gerrymandering . . . may balkanize us into competing racial
factions.'"0
Race, however, is not a "stereotype" or an "assumption" in
Georgia. It is a reality. In addition, there is no credible evidence that

proportionality-is imposed." Brief for the United States at 35, United States v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (No. 94-929). The Attorney General does consider "the
relationship between the number of majority-minority districts and the minority's
percentage of the population," id. at 36, but that is a relationship the Court has held to
be "obviously" relevant to the question of minority vote dilution. Johnson v. De
Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647,2661 (1994).
87. In its prior cases, the Court acknowledged that the historical and
contemporaneous record is the strongest and best evidence of legislative purpose.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 595-96 & n.19 (1987) (noting that after-the-fact
statements are "of little relevance in determining the intent of the legislature"); Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,267-68 (1977).
88. Justice Ginsburg supplied this omission in her dissenting opinion. See Miller, 115
S. Ct. at 2500-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2486 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,2827 (1993)).

90. Id.
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the creation of highly integrated districts, such as the Eleventh
District, have caused social harm or balkanization.
A. Race Is No Stereotype in Georgia
Racial discrimination in Georgia was so apparent that the threejudge court took judicial notice of it. It held that evidence of discrimination "against black people in the State of Georgia need not be
presented for purposes of this case."9' The court took judicial notice
that:
No one can deny that State and local governments of Georgia
in the past utilized widespread, pervasive practices to
segregate the races which had the effect of repressing Black
citizens, individually and as a group.
...By

law, public schools and public housing were segregated
according to race. Public recreational facilities were
segregated. Miscegenation was prohibited. Ordinances
required segregation in public transportation, restaurants,
hotels, restrooms, theaters, and other such facilities, even
drinking fountains.
...Public services were allocated along racial lines .... In
public employment, black workers were often paid less than
white workers for the same job. In addition, methods of jury
selection were developed to exclude Black people from jury
service.
Georgia's history on voting rights includes discrimination
against Black citizens. From the State's first Constitution-which
barred Blacks from voting altogether-through recent times, the State
has employed various means of destroying or diluting Black voting
strength. For example, literacy tests (enacted as late as 1958) and
property requirements were early means of excluding large numbers
of Blacks from the voting process. Also, White primaries unconstitutionally prevented Blacks from voting in primary elections at
the state and county level.
Even after Black citizens were provided access to voting, the
State used various means to minimize their voting power. For
example, until 1962, the county unit system was used to undermine

91. Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix at 119, Abrams v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995) (No. 94-797) [hereinafter J.S. App.]; Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at 142.
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the voting strength of counties with large Black populations.
Congressional districts have been drawn in the past to discriminate
against Black citizens by minimizing their voting potential. State
plans discriminated by packing an excessive number of Black
citizens into a single district or splitting large and contiguous groups
of Black citizens between multiple districts.9 The parties themselves,
far from denying it, stipulated to much of this history and its
continuing effects. 93
A continuing pattern of racial discrimination in voting in the
state was so self-evident that the court refused to accept as exhibits
seventeen consent decrees offered by the Abrams intervenors
entered between 1977 and 1993 in section 2 challenges brought
against jurisdictions located in whole or in part within the Eleventh
District. The court ruled that the decrees showed "a pattern of racial
discrimination
in Voting Rights that we have already taken judicial
94
notice of.
While the decrees themselves were disallowed as exhibits, the
parties stipulated that "voting rights litigation against the
jurisdiction [located in whole or in part in the present Eleventh
District] resulted in changes in the challenged electoral system(s)
and/or judicial findings of racial bloc voting" in Baldwin County,
Milledgeville, Burke County, Effingham County, Butts County,
Greene County, Henry County, Jefferson County, Jenkins County,
Putnam County, Richmond County, Augusta, Screven County,
Twiggs County, Wilkes County, Waynesboro, and Warrenton.95

92. J.S. App. supra note 91, at 119-20. Even moderate politicians waged openly racist
campaigns into the 1960s. In his 1962 run for governor, Carl Sanders had a
"Segregation" plank in his platform declaring that:
My record in support of legislation over the years to maintain segregation is
long, continuing, and well-known. It is not one of empty oratory, but concrete
results. It rests upon law and order and the consent of the governed. As your
governor, every legal means and every lawful resource available will be utilized to
the fullest to strengthen and to maintain Georgia's traditional separation,
sponsored by the responsible leadership of the State, and passed almost
unanimously by the General Assembly. Legal attacks against Georgia's
institutions in the federal courts will be resisted, and with every available defense.
Here's Complete Text of Sen. Carl Sanders' Platform, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 1, 1962, at
46.
93. See, e.g., Stip., supra note 33, ' 5 (showing that of Georgia's 1992 VAP, Whites
registered at 70.22%, Blacks at 59.8%); id. 919176-103 (detailing the history of
discrimination in voting); id. 9191104-29 (describing segregation in educational
institutions); id. 991 130-134 (noting other forms of racial discrimination); id. 9191
135-55
(stipulating to racial disparities in income, education, unemployment, and poverty
status); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2475; Jt. App., supra note 14, at 9-33.
94. Trans., supra note 12, vol. VI,at 207.
95. Stip., supra note 33, 91103. The court also refused on similar grounds of
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Courts have also made findings of racial bloc voting in Bleckley,
Carroll, Colquitt, DeKalb, Dougherty, and Fulton Counties.96
The experts who testified for both sides, while they disagreed as
to degree, did agree that voting in Georgia today is racially
polarized. Allan Lichtman, an expert for the United States, examined
more than 300 elections spanning an approximately twenty-year
period.97 He- used the standard statistical techniques of ecological
regression and extreme case analysis, and examined four sets, or
levels, of Black/White contests: (1) county level contests throughout
the state, (2) county level contests within the Eleventh and Second
Districts, (3) six statewide elections partitioned within the
boundaries of the Eleventh and Second Districts, and (4) the 1992
Eleventh and Second District elections. 98
As for level one, Lichtman's analysis showed "strong" patterns
of racial bloc voting, with Blacks and Whites voting "overwhelmingly" for candidates of their own race.9 Level two and three
analysis also showed "strong" patterns of racial bloc voting.' °° In five
of the six statewide contests in the Eleventh District, at least eightynine percent of Blacks voted for Black candidates, and at least
seventy-four percent of Whites voted for White candidates.'' The
exception to the pattern was the 1992 Democratic primary for labor
commissioner in which the Black candidate got forty-five percent of
the White vote, and ninety-six percent of the Black vote. In the
ensuing primary run-off, the Black candidate got only twenty-six
percent of the White vote, and ninety-two percent of the Black
vote. '2
The 1992 primary and run-off in the Eleventh District were also
racially polarized. In the primary, which involved one White and
four Black candidates, the White candidate, DeLoach, was the first
choice among Whites with forty-five percent of the White vote.
McKinney, who was the leading vote-getter over all, was second
among Whites with twenty percent of the White vote. ' In the runredundancy to accept as exhibits compilations of Section 2 challenges brought between
1974 and 1990 to at-large elections in 40 cities and 57 counties throughout the state. See
Trans., supra note 12, vol. VI, at 207.
96. Stip., supra note 33, 1 102.
97. Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at 200.
98. Department of Justice Exhibit 24, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga.
1994) (No. 194-008) [hereinafter DOJ Ex. 24]; Department of Justice Exhibit 41, Johnson
v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (No. 194-008); Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at
199.
99. DOJ Ex. 24, supra note 98, at 7-8.
100. DOJ Ex. 24 supra note 98, at 8-9; Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at 202-03.
101. DOJ Ex. 24, supra note 98, at 9.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id. at 17.
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off, Whites increased their support of DeLoach to seventy-seven
percent. McKinney's White vote support increased to just twentythree percent.'"
Lichtman also testified that Blacks have a lower socioeconomic
status than Whites, which status has served as a barrier to their
participation in the political process.' 5 In the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections, Black turnout was fourteen to fifteen percent lower
than White turnout.'0 6 In the 1992 elections in the Eleventh District,
Blacks were 51.5% of all voters in the primary, but only forty-six to
forty-seven percent of voters in the run-off.' 7
The State's expert, Joseph Katz, performed an independent
homogeneous precinct analysis to estimate "average racial voting
patterns."'1 He agreed that "[w]hites tend to vote for white candidates and blacks tend to vote for black candidates."' 09 He concluded
that Whites vote for White candidates in the range of seventy-one to
seventy-three percent."' He did not believe a Black candidate had an
even (fifty percent) chance to win until a district contained at least
fifty percent of Black registered voters."'
The plaintiffs' expert, Ronald Weber, agreed there was "some
evidence" of racial polarization in voting.' 2 Taking into account
judicial elections involving appointed Black incumbents,
he did not
113
think the racial bloc voting was "very strong."
Experienced local politicians also testified that voting was
racially polarized. Representative Tyrone Brooks said that "[riacially
polarized voting in this state is a reality, and we cannot run from
that. ," 4 Lieutenant Governor Pierre Howard testified that "there are
still a lot of whites in Georgia, I'm sure, who won't vote for a black
candidate, and I'm sure that there are black [voters] who won't vote

104. Id. 1.chtman found voting patterns to be different in statewide nonpartisan
judicial elections in which appointed Blacks ran as incumbents. He included these
contests in his report but treated them as having "minimal relevance." See also Trans.,
supra note 12, vol. V, at 228.
105. Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at 206.
106. Id. at 208.
107. Id. at 212-13.
108. Id. at 48,81.
109. Id. at 84.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 84-85. Katz also found judicial elections to be "materially different" and
that it would be "inappropriate" to use them in determining voting patterns in
congressional elections. Trans., supra note 12, vol. V, at 74, 83.
112. Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV, at 259.
113. Id. at 324. The district court conceded that "some degree of vote polarization
exists," but said that "[e]xact levels are unknowable." Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. at
1390.
114. Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV, at 228.
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for a white candidate."'1 5 Intervenor Luscious Abrams, a Burke
County farmer who has worked in a number of local political
campaigns, testified that "a black will not win out of a majority
white district.""' Kathleen Wilde, a former ACLU staff attorney with
extensive experience in voting rights litigation in Georgia who was
called as a witness by the plaintiffs, said that "[r]acial polarization in
voting is sufficiently strong throughout the state that majority white
white candidates, both state wide
districts have historically elected
'
and in districting systems. 17
Of the forty Black members of the Georgia General Assembly,
only one was elected from a majority-White district." 8 Of the thirtyone Black members of the House, twenty-six were elected from
districts that were sixty percent or more Black. Of the nine Black
members of the Senate, eight were elected from districts that were
sixty percent or more Black."9 While only one Black was elected
from a majority-White district, Whites won in sixteen (twenty-nine
percent) of the fifty-five majority-Black House and Senate districts. 2'
With the exception of judicial elections in which Blacks were first
appointed and ran as incumbents, no Black has ever been elected to
a statewide office in Georgia. 2'
In its prior decisions, the Court stressed that a history of
discrimination was highly relevant to the issue of minority political
participation and in evaluating the lawfulness of voting practices
under constitutional and statutory standards. In Rogers v. Lodge," for
example, the Court noted that a history of discrimination touches on
or influences voter registration, education, participation in party
affairs, and socioeconomic status, all of which affect political
participation. In White v. Register,'2 the Court invalidated at-large
elections in Bexar County, Texas in part because of the history of
discrimination and its continuing affects on the minority community. And in Thornburg v. Gingles"', the Court described as "[tihe
essence" of vote dilution the adverse interaction of an electoral

115. Id. at 220.
116. Trans., supra note 12, vol. VI, at 57.
117. Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV, at 106.
118. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2475; Trans., supra note 12, vol. IV, at 236; Jt. App., supra
note 14, at 26-27.
119. Abrams Intervenors Exhibits 23-24, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.
Ga. 1994) (No. 194-008); Department of Justice Exhibit 57, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.
Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (No. 194-008); Trans., supra note 12, vol. VI, at 204,208.
120. Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475; Jt. App., supra note 14, at 26-27.
121. Trans., supra note 12, vol. VI, at 77.
122. 458 U.S. 613, 624-27 (1982).
123. 412 U.S. 755,768 (1973).
124. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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practice "with social and historical conditions."''1
The majority in Miller chose to ignore the history of discrimination in Georgia and indulged the purest fiction of a colorblind political process."'No
decision that blinds itself to reality in
this fashion can command respect or claim to be reliable.
B. The Absence of Harm
When it amended section 2 in 1982, Congress concluded that
there was no factual basis for contending that majority-minority
districts increased racial tensions or caused other harm. Critics of the
1982 amendment argued that a results standard for section 2 would
"deepen the tensions, fragmentation and outright resentment among
racial groups,
pit race against race,"1
"exacerbate, race
consciousness,"'2 "foster polarization,"'3 and "compel the worst tendencies toward race-based allegiances and divisions.' 3' Opponents
also argued that the amendment would limit the political opportunities of minorities by allowing them "to become isolated" in
single-member districts, and "prevent[ing] minority members from
exercising influence on the political system beyond the bounds of
their quota.' 32 Dissenting members of the Senate subcommittee
similarly argued that adoption of a results standard for section 2
would lead to the creation of majority-minority districts, or "political
ghettos for minorities. '' 1u
Congress weighed and rejected these arguments on the ground
that there was no evidence to support them. It concluded that the
amendment would not "be a divisive factor in local communities by
emphasizing the role of racial politics."'34 The testimony and other
evidence presented to the subcommittee belied the speculative

125. Id. at 47.
126. As one scholar has observed, the color blind model of politics in the South, i.e.,
"[t]he arguments that Blacks need not run in 'safe' minority districts to be elected, that
White voters increasingly support Black politicians, that racial bloc voting is now
unusual-all turn out to be among the great myths currently distorting public
discussion." Richard H. Pildes, The Politicsof Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (1995).
127. Voting Rights Act: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 662 (1982) (statement of John H. Bunzel).
128. Id. at 745 (statement of Michael Levin).
129. Id. at 1250 (statement of Henry Abraham).
130. Id. at 1328 (statement of Donald L. Horowitz).
131. Id. at 1449 (letter from William Van Alstyne).
132. Id. at 511 (statement of Edward J.Erler), 1115 (statement of Robert M. Brinson).
133. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 18,at 103 (additional views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch of

Utah).
134. Id. at 32-33.
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"assumptions" that the amendment of section 2 would limit the
political opportunities of minorities.'-1 The subcommittee found
there was "an extensive, reliable and reassuring track record of court
decisions using the very standard which the Committee bill would
codify."16
The Supreme Court has said that where Congress has assessed
and weighed conflicting factors in an area such as voting rights in
which it has a specially informed legislative competence, it is not the
duty of the Court "to review the congressional resolution of these
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which
the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."'37 There clearly is a
basis upon which Congress could determine that majority-minority
districts were neither stigmatizing nor racially polarizing. In striking
down the Eleventh District, the Court ignored its own precedents as
well as the determinations of Congress.
The decisions of district courts in the post-Shaw v. Reno
redistricting cases support the findings of Congress. In Johnson v.
Miller the three-judge court, even though it invalidated the Eleventh
District, concluded that "the plaintiffs suffered no individual harm;
the 1992 congressional redistricting plans had no adverse consequences for these white voters."' ' A parade of witnesses testified
that the Eleventh District had not increased racial tension, caused
segregation, imposed a racial stigma, deprived anyone of representation, caused harm, or guaranteed Blacks a congressional seat.'39
The district court acknowledged that under the Court's pre-Shaw
decisions, "this lack of concrete, individual harm would deny them
Court did not
[the plaintiffs] standing to sue."'" The Supreme
4
'
harm.1
no
of
finding
court's
district
the
disturb
The district court in Hays v. Louisiana,42 while holding unconstitutional congressional redistricting in Louisiana, nonetheless
acknowledged "the great benefits that are derived by an increase in
minority representation in government.', 43 Minority elected officials
135. Id. at 31-32.
136. Id.at 32.
137. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
138. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
at 268; id., vol. IV, at 104, 106,239, 240,242; id., vol.
139. Trans., supra note 12, vol. ImI,
VI, at 36,38,45,47,56,58,117,120.
140. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1370.
141. Ironically, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the
majority's "representational harms" analysis in Miller is premised on the very
assumptions and stereotypes it purports to reject, i.e., that voters of a particular race
think alike, share the same political interests, etc. See Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2497-98
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994), vacatedand remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
143. 862 F. Supp. at 128 (Shaw, J., concurring).
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"have shown that they perform admirably," that their efforts in government "provide positive role models for all black citizens," and
that they "insure that the legal obstacles to minority advancement in
all areas of life will be eliminated."'4"
The majority-minority congressional districts in the South are in
fact the most racially integrated districts in the country. They contain
substantial numbers of White voters, an average of forty-five
percent."s Moreover, Blacks in the South continue to be represented
more often by White than by Black members of Congress, fifty-eight
percent versus forty-two percent.16No one familiar with segregation
could ever confuse existing redistricting plans, with their highly
integrated districts, with racial
segregation under
u e which Blacks were
run for office.
or
vote
to
not allowed
Whites are also frequently elected from majority-minority
districts. During the 1970s, Whites won in forty-one percent of the
majority-Black districts in the House, and in seventy-five percent of
the majority-Black districts in the Senate in seven southern states
(Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina (Senate
only), South Carolina, and Virginia).' In the 1980s in the same
states, Whites won in twenty-three percent of the majority-Black
House districts and in thirty-eight percent of the majority-Black
Senate districts.'" Given these levels of White success, racially integrated majority-minority districts cannot be dismissed simply as
''quotas" or segregated seats for minorities.
The evidence also suggests that integrated majority-minority
districts have promoted the formation of biracial coalitions and
actually dampened racial bloc voting. In Mississippi, after the
creation of the majority-Black Second Congressional District, Mike
Espy, an African American, was elected in 1986 with about twelve
percent of the White vote. In 1988, he won re-election with forty

144. Id.
145. DAvID A. BosIs, JOINT CrR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STuDIES,
REDISRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: THE CREATION OF MAJORITY-MINORTY Du-TRmcrS
AND THE EVOLVING PARTY SYSTEM IN THE SOurH 28 (1995).

146. Id.at 12.
147. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of
Georgia's poll tax for voting); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (approving the
exclusion of Blacks from participating in Democratic primary elections in Texas); Giles
v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (approving the disenfranchisement of Black voters in
Alabama).
148. See Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Minority Representation:Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional
Delegations, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 21, at 335, 345 (containing a table
presenting the percentage of Blacks elected to Congress from majority-Black districts).
149. Id.
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percent of the White vote'O and sixty-six percent of the vote
overall.' According to one veteran observer of the voting rights
scene, the increased willingness of Whites in Mississippi to vote for a
Black candidate in a racially integrated congressional district
suggests that the creation of majority-minority districts and the
subsequent election of minority candidates reduces White fear and
harmful stereotyping of minority candidates, ameliorates the racial
balkanization of American society and promotes a political system
in which race does not matter as much as it did before.'52
In Georgia, the Second and Eleventh Congressional Districts
became majority Black for the first time in 1992.'s From 1984 to 1990,
only one percent of White voters in the precincts within the Second,
and four percent of White voters in the precincts within the
Eleventh, voted for minority candidates in statewide elections. An
encouraging increase in White crossover voting occurred in 1992.
Twenty-nine percent of White voters in the Second and thirty-seven
percent of White voters in the Eleventh voted for minority
candidates in statewide elections that year.54
The majority-Black Second Congressional District in Louisiana
was created in 1983 as a result of litigation under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.' In 1984, only eight percent of Whites voted for
the Black candidate in the Democratic congressional primary in the
Second District. In the 1990 election, forty-four percent of White
voters voted for Black candidates, and in the 1992 election seventyfour percent of Whites voted for Black candidates.5 6 From 1986 to
1990 White voting for Black congressional candidates in Louisiana's
majority-White Fourth Congressional District ranged from three
percent (three elections) to twenty-two percent (one election). After
the district became a majority-minority district in 1992'17 White
voting for Black candidates rose to fifty-eight percent.'ss
The voting trends in Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, states
included within the coverage of section 5 because of their long
150. JOHN DlTrMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI
426(1994).
151. 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 3A, 31A (1988).
152. Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionalityof Racial Redistricting:A Critiqueof Shaw v.
Reno, 3 DEr. C.L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1995).
153. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483-84 (detailing the districting process that resulted in
the creation of the majority-Black districts).
154. DOJ Ex. 24, supra note 98, at Tables I-rn.
155. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188,1191,1210 (W.D. La. 1993).
156. Declaration of Richard Engstrom at Chart One, Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp.
119 (W.D. La. 1994). (The years between 1984 and 1990 did not involve any
Black/White congressional elections that could be included in the analysis).
157. Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1196 n.21.
158. See Declaration of Richard Engstrom, supra note 156.
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histories of discrimination against minorities in voting,'" undermine
the argument that highly integrated majority-minority districts have
increased polarization.' To the contrary, they hold out the promise,
perhaps for the first time6 in the South's troubled history, of
meaningful biracial politics. '
IV. THE EXPANSION OF SHAW V. RENO

Miller significantly expanded the "racial gerrymandering" cause
of action derived from the Fourteenth Amendment as first
recognized in Shaw v. Reno.'6 In Shaw, the Court held that "a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification," is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court in Shaw appeared to hold that, to establish a claim and invoke strict scrutiny, a
plaintiff had to establish three elements: (1) the challenged plan was
"bizarre" or "irrational" on its face,'" and not merely "somewhat
irregular,"' ' (2) the plan was "unexplainable on grounds other than

159. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,309 (1966).
160. As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg recognized, Georgia's congressional plan was
a form of "racial integration," Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting), designed
to ensure the inclusion of Blacks in the political process. Id. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
161. C. Vann Woodward has argued that a similar opportunity existed during the
brief Populist movement of the 1890s before the South capitulated to extreme racism
and during which "Negroes and native [W]hites achieved a greater comity of mind and
harmony of political purpose than ever before or since in the South." C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 64 (2d ed. 1966). Whatever the
opportunity for racial justice and cooperation it held out, the Populist movement in
Georgia failed in large measure because of the demagogic and destructive use of the
race issue by White state and local politicians at the time. C. VANN WOODWARD, TOM
WATSON: AGRARIAN REBEL 189 (1973).
162. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). Prior to Shaw, the Court had recognized Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection daims only to enforce the one person, one vote
requirement, and to prevent the dilution of minority voting strength. E.g., Miller, 115 S.
Ct. at 2502; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
For a discussion of Shaw, see Parker, supranote 152, at 1, where the author noted:
[T]he Supreme Court, by a 5-to-4 vote, held for the first time that plaintiffs could
challenge bizarrely-shaped majority-minority districts as an equal protection
violation, even though the redistricting plan was racially neutral on its face and
there were no allegations that the plan was adopted for a racially discriminatory
purpose or had a racially discriminatory effect.
163. Shaw, 113S.Ct. at2832.
164. Id. at 2825,2832.
165. Id. at 2826.
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race," 1" and (3) the "only" possible explanation for the plan was a
purpose to "segregate" the races for purposes of voting. 67 Stated
succinctly, the conjunction of bizarre shape, race consciousness, and
harm appeared to be the essential predicates for a claim under
Shaw.'"
Moreover, the Court did not indicate that bizarre shape alone
raised constitutional concerns or triggered strict scrutiny. It reaf'
firmed that "compactness" was not "constitutionally required."' 9
Nor did Shaw condemn the consideration of race in redistricting per
se. According to'''7
Shaw, "race-conscious redistricting is not always
unconstitutional. 0
Shaw did not overrule United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 7' which upheld without subjecting to
strict scrutiny a state's legislative redistricting plan that "deliberately used race in a purposeful manner" to create majorityminority districts.17 The Court found no constitutional violation
because there was no dilution of the plaintiffs' voting strength.1n
Shaw distinguished United Jewish Organizations on the grounds that
the plaintiffs in United Jewish Organizations "did not allege that the
plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be
understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race."' Thus, in
its discussion of United Jewish Organizations,Shaw underscored that
the consideration of race in redistricting was constitutionally suspect
only in the context of bizarre district shape and harm to voters.

166. Id. at 2825.
167. Id. at 2832.
168. The Shaw Court repeatedly stated that its holding was limited only to districting
plans that were "bizarre," facially "irrational," "highly irregular," "extremely irregular,"
"dramatically irregular," or "tortured." 113 S.Ct. at 2818, 2820, 2824-27, 2829, 2831-32,
2842-43, 2845, 2848. By its terms, the decision appeared to apply only to the "rare" and
"exceptional cases." Id. at 2825-26.
169. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973)
("compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent
federal constitutional requirement for State legislative districts").
170. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824,2826.
171. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
172. Id. at 165.
173. Id. at 165-66 (White, J., joined by Stevens, J., and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 179-80
(Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Powell, J.).
174. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829.
175. Commentators agreed that "Shaw is best read as an exceptional doctrine for
aberrational contexts rather than as a prelude to a sweeping constitutional
condemnation of race-conscious redistricting." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts,' and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 495 (1993). According to
Professors Pildes and Niemi, the unique harm communicated by a bizarre district was
"the social impression that race consciousness has overridden all other, traditionally
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Shaw also recognized that "redistricting differs from other kinds
of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race
when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic
status, religion and political persuasion, and a variety of other
demographic factors. ' 1 6 Because race is inherent in redistricting,
Shaw repeatedly stressed that it must be the "only" factor driving the
process to trigger strict scrutiny."
In Miller, however, the Court went far beyond the rule it
appeared to adopt in Shaw, and added further confusion to the law
of redistricting. The Court held that proof of a bizarre district shape
was not a threshold requirement for a Shaw challenge, but was only
one method of proving an impermissible racial purpose. A
plaintiff may show either through circumstantial evidence of a
district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to
legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating
the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters
within or without a particular district.'"
Shaw, with its emphasis on aesthetics or district appearance,
was, admittedly, highly problematic. Different judges can look at the
identical district and reach totally different conclusions about
whether or not it is bizarre. Two members of the three-judge court
found the Eleventh District to be bizarre, while the third member
concluded that it was notl" Not a single member of the Supreme
Court found the Eleventh District to be bizarre.'
relevant redistricting values." Id. at 526. Nonbizarrely shaped districts, including those
which were race conscious, did not communicate such concerns. Id. at 519. T.
Alexander Aleinkoff & Samuel Issacharoff reached a similar conclusion in Race and
Redistricting:Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 61314,644 (1993).
176. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826. The chief demographer for the State of Georgia, who
had drawn hundreds of redistricting plans at the federal, state, and local levels over the
past two decades, acknowledged that she had "never drawn a redistricting plan... that
didn't take race into account," and that "if taking race into account were unlawful...
there is not a redistricting plan in the State of Georgia that would be valid." Trans.,
supranote 12, vol. 11, at 265.
177. E.g., 113 S.Ct. at 2824 (classification "solely on the basis of race"); id. at 2825
(action "unexplainable on grounds other than race"); id. at 2826 ("anything other than
an effort" to segregate voters); id. at 2827 ("created solely" on the basis of race); id. at
2828 ("cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters" along
racial grounds).
178. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
179. Id. at 2488.
180. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1396 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting) (I cannot find and cannot conclude that... the Eleventh District is bizarre
or highly irregular within the meaning of Shaw.")
181. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2489 ("the geometric shape of the Eleventh District may not
seem bizarre on its face"); id. at 2502 ("Georgia's Eleventh District is hardly 'bizarre,'
'extremely irregular,' or 'irrational on its face."') (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Aside from
the subjective nature of appearance, there is no generally accepted social science
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Despite Shaw's obvious shortcomings, as Justice Ginsburg
noted, the decision's "[glenuine attention to traditional districting
practices and avoidance of bizarre configuration seemed . . . to
provide a safe harbor."' 2 Under Miller, that is no longer the case.
V. THE LACK OF FAIR AND RELIABLE STANDARDS IN REDISTRICrING

Although the "predominant" use of race is constitutionally
suspect, the Court did not, as Justice O'Connor's decisive concurring
opinion indicates, hold that race could not be taken into account in
redistricting. She described the Court's standard as "a demanding
one. ' To invoke strict scrutiny, "a plaintiff must show that the
State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and
traditional districting practices."'
Given this standard, "the vast
majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts, where presumably the states have drawn the boundaries in accordance with
their customary districting principles," would not be thrown into
doubt, "even though race may well have been considered in the

measure for determining district regularity or compactness. See Bernard Grofman,
Criteriafor Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77, 85 (1985)
("There are many different ways of applying a compactness requirement but none is
generally accepted as definitive."). The plaintiffs' expert in Miller was of the opinion
that "geographical compactness" is "such a hazy and ill-defined concept that it seems
impossible to apply it in any rigorous sense in matters of law." Trans., supra note 12,
vol. IV, at 282.
In truth, it does not take much imagination to characterize a district as being
"bizarre" or to describe it in pejorative terms, e.g., that it looks like "a large bulbous
affair" or a "proboscis." Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1389. One reference work has
described the Fourth District in Massachusetts as being shaped like a "saxophone,"
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., POLTICs IN AMERICA 1994: 103RD CONGRESS 726
(Phil Duncan ed., 1993) [hereinafter POLmcs N AMERICA], and Oregon's Fifth
District as looking like "the State fish." Id. at 1277. Even Polonius, that most literal
minded and unimaginative of men, was able to see--with some help from Hamletcamels, whales, and weasels in the clouds passing overhead. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
HAMLE r act 3, sc. 2. ("Ham. Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a
camel?. Pol. By th' mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed. Ham. Methinks it is like a
weasel. Pol. It is back'd like a weasel. Ham. Or like a whale. Pol. Very like a whale.").
The description of the shape of legislative districts in derogatory terms may be part
of a tradition of political or media drollery, but as the Court wisely concluded in
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 735 n.18 (1973), district "compactness or
attractiveness" is a concept that does not deserve to be enshrined in constitutional
analysis.
182. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507.
183. Id. at 2497.
184. Id. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority is to the same effect: "A plaintiff
must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial
considerations." Id. at 2488.
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redistricting process."' s The essence of the Court's decision was to
make "extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to meaningful
judicial review."1"
It is far from clear, however, when taking race into account in
redistricting would be permissible and when it would not. A
legislature may properly "be aware of racial demographics," but it
may not allow race to predominate in the redistricting process.' 1 A
state "is free to recognize communities that have a particular racial
make-up, provided its action is directed toward some common
thread of relevant interests."' As the Court itself acknowledged,
however, it may prove difficult to make a distinction between
awareness of racial make-up and motivation based on race in
drawing district lines. 9
The difficulty in applying Miller is evident from the sharp
disagreement among the members of the Court. Four members
concluded in dissent that "[t]he record before us does not show that
race... overwhelmed traditional districting practices in Georgia."'9
The district "reflects significant consideration of 'traditional
districting factors (such as keeping political subdivisions intact) and
the usual political process of compromise and trades for a variety of

185. Id. at 2497. Justice Ginsburg, purportedly expressing the views of the Court as a
whole, said that "state legislatures may recognize communities that have a particular
racial or ethnic makeup, even in the absence of any compulsion to do so, in order to
account for interests common to or shared by the persons grouped together." Id. at 2500.
This view is consistent with that expressed by Justice O'Connor in her opinion,
concurring in the judgment in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), in which she
noted that one of the essential purposes of redistricting was to "reconcile the competing
claims of political, religious, ethnic, racial, occupational and socioeconomic groups." Id.
at 147. Other members of the Court have expressed similar views in other cases. See
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 87 (legislators "necessarily make judgments about the
probability that the members of certain identifiable groups, whether racial, ethnic,
economic, or religious, will vote in the same way") (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment); United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
176 n.4 (1977) ("It would be naive to suppose that racial considerations do not enter into
apportionment decisions") (Brennan, J., concurring); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,
144 (1976) ("[L]awmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white
or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the
racial composition of the district") (White, J., dissenting). As the Court noted in Shaw v.
Reno "when members of a racial group live together in one community, a
reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and
excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes." 113 S. Ct. at 2626.
186. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497.
187. Id. at 2488.
188. Id. at 2490.
189. Id. at 2488 ("[tlhe distinction between being aware of racial considerations and
being motivated by them may be difficult to make").
190. Id. at 2502 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, Souter, JJ., dissenting).
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nonracial reasons."'pi
As in any redistricting, partisan political concerns and the
purely personal preferences of individual legislators also influenced
the Eleventh District's boundaries."i Speaker Murphy, for example,
an ardent Democrat, advised the chair of the House Reapportionment Committee that he (Murphy) would not support any plan
that included Harrelson County (Murphy's county of residence) in
the Sixth Congressional District. The sole reason for excluding
Harrelson County was that the Sixth District was represented by
Newt Gingrich, a Republican.' s According to Murphy, "Congressman Gingrich and I never got along. We didn't talk. We didn't like
each other and I just wanted out of his district."'4 As a result of accommodating Murphy, "all the counties got split in the Sixth."' 9
The configuration of the Eleventh District was affected by numerous nonracial factors. The district was drawn in an irregular
manner near the eastern border of DeKalb County to accommodate
the request of an incumbent senator that the majority-White precinct
in which his son lived be included in the district.' 96 The district was
drawn in a narrow corridor through Effingham County at the
request of a White state representative.Y9 It was drawn in Chatham
County by "the narrowest means possible" at the request of another
White legislator. 98 The portion of the Eleventh District in Henry
County is narrow because the State made the decision to follow
precinct lines.'9 The State made the decision to keep several rural
majority-White counties in the district intact, even though, according
to the State's demographer, it resulted in drawing more irregular
lines elsewhere, i.e., making "them a little bit more crooked and
maybe not follow the major thoroughfare all the way through," in
191. Id. at 2503 (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354,1397 n.5 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting)). The total land area of the Eleventh District "is about
average for the State;" its miles of border are "in line with Georgia's Second District"; of
the 22 counties in the district, eight are divided, "about the state average;" 71% of the
district's boundaries follow the borders of political subdivisions, average for the state as
a whole; 83% of the district's area is composed of intact counties, "above average for the
State's congressional districts;" and, the district's "boundaries largely follow precinct
lines." Id. at 2503.
192. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. Trans., supra note 12, vol. I, at 73,75,77.
194. Id. at 77.
195. Id., vol. HI, at 729. Murphy intervened in redistricting on other occasions, none
of which were related to race. He moved precinct lines in DeKalb County as a personal
favor to the Lieutenant Governor. On another occasion, Murphy moved precinct lines
in Gwinnett County at the request of a House colleague. Id., vol. 11, at 78-79.
196. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2503; Trans., supra note 12, vol. I, at 187,202.
197. 115 S.Ct. at 2503.
198. Id. at 2504.
199. Trans., supra note 12, vol. I, at 207-09.
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urban areas such as Augusta and Savannah. As Murphy noted,
redistricting is "vastly different" from other matters that come before
the General Assembly because "it's not just a one-issue thing.
There's [sic] hundreds of issues because there are hundreds of
people wanting their property and their county in a different
district. '20' Given the record in Miller, there clearly is a basis upon
which a court could conclude-as four members of the Supreme
Court did-that the State had not subordinated all its traditional
redistricting principles to race.
A. DeWitt v. Wilson
The Court added to the difficulty of determining the
permissible role of race in redistricting by summarily affirming, on
the same day it decided Miller, a district court decision rejecting a
claim, identical to Miller, that California's legislative redistricting
was a racial gerrymander. 202 The California plan was drawn by a
panel of three special masters after the legislature deadlocked over
redistricting, and was approved by the Supreme Court of California.
The masters undeniably took race into account as a predominant
factor in drawing their plan and frequently subordinated the state's
traditional redistricting principles to race.
The special masters, whose report is published as an appendix
to the decision of the Supreme Court of California approving the
plan,m drew districts to maximize the number of majority-minority
districts. According to the Supreme Court of California, the masters
engaged in "successful efforts to maximize the actual and potential
voting strength of all geographically compact minority groups of
significant voting population."2m The masters gave "federal Voting
Rights Act requirements ... the highest possible consideration."
Because they were unaware of patterns of racial bloc voting, they
chose to "draw boundaries that will withstand section 2 challenges
under any foreseeable combination of factual circumstances and
legal rulings." 2 6
200. Id. at 29-30, 143-44. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1396 (S.D. Ga.
1994) (Edmondson, J., dissenting) ("the Eleventh makes curious turns in some areas...
[b]ut, in these areas most of the lines follow existing city boundaries or major highways
and roads").
201. Trans., supra note 12, vol. I, at 92-93.
202. DeWitt v. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995), affirming, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal.
1994).
203. See Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545 (1992) (App. I, Report of the Special Masters).
204. Id. at 559.
205. Id. at 563.
206. Id. at 565.
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Justice Mosk of the Supreme Court of California lamented in
dissent that "in some instances the masters apparently believed they
could perform their duty only by the affirmative use of racial
quotas."' 7 Despite the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts, the three-judge court found that strict scrutiny was not
required because the masters "sought to balance the many
traditional redistricting principles, including the requirements of the
Voting Rights Act." 2
If there is a clear basis upon which to distinguish DeWitt from
Miller, other than the fact that the redistricting plan in the former
was drawn by special masters and in the latter by a legislature, it is
not apparent. Justice Ginsburg was surely correct in warning that
the amorphous standard enunciated in Miller "renders redistricting
perilous work for state legislatures." '
B. An Invitation to Redistricting Litigation
Justice Ginsburg further characterized the decision of the
majority in Miller as an "invitation to litigation., 210 It is proving to be
just that. On remand in Miller, for example, the plaintiffs promptly
moved to add parties to challenge the majority-Black Second
Congressional District. The three-judge court, as promptly, granted
the motion.2" One member of the panel seemed prepared to rule
from the bench that the district was unconstitutional.
Two residents of the majority-Black Third Congressional
District in Virginia filed a post-Miller lawsuit claiming that race was
"the overriding" factor in redistricting in that state.21 ' A similar
challenge was filed against the Fourth Congressional District in
Illinois.§4 Shaw/Miller challenges are also pending against the Third

207. Id. at 615.
208. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994). The three-judge
court also found that the plan would survive even if strict scrutiny were applied. Id. at
1415.
209. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507. One voting rights expert accused the Court of acting
"terribly irresponsibly. They haven't offered any safe harbor. There is nothing you can
do in redistricting now that can keep you from getting sued." Holly Idelson, It's Back to
the Drawing Board On Minority Districts,CONG. Q., Oct. 7,1995, at 3065.
210. Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2495,2505.
211. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 76, at 3.
212. Id. at 66 ("1 really don't see that it takes long to look at this horse [the Second
District] .... I don't think it will take a long evidentiary hearing to conclude what we
have already concluded [about the Eleventh District]") (comments of Judge Edenfield).
213. Plaintiff's Complaint at 8, Moon v. Beyer, No. 3:95CV942 (E.D. Va. filed Nov.
17, 1995).
214. PAC for Middle Am. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 95-C-827, 1995 WL 571887
(N.D. M. Sept. 22,1995).
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Congressional District in Florida, 215 and the Twelfth Congressional
District in New York.216
Within days of the Miller decision, the Governor of Georgia
called the legislature into special session to redistrict the Congress.
The General Assembly began its deliberations on August 14, 1995.
After several weeks of fruitless wrangling and uncertainty over the
standards applicable in redistricting, the legislature adjourned
without adopting a plan.218 The Chair of the Senate Reapportionment
Committee said that "[wie have heard from five different attorneys
and we have received five different interpretations."219 She admitted
that "[n]obody knows what they're doing."2 Following the legislative deadlock, the district court, in another divided decision,
redrew the State's congressional districts. 2' That decision, which
abolished two of the State's three majority-Black districts, has been
appealed by the Abrams' intervenors and the United States.2m
While the Georgia legislature was unable to redraw its congressional districts, it did pass new plans for the Senate and the
House. Although legislative redistricting was not an issue in Miller,
and no court has suggested that the House and Senate plans were
unconstitutional, the Governor included legislative redistricting in
his call for a special session. Once the legislature was in session, one
of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in Miller advised House
and Senate redistricting committees that "[wie are prepared to
initiate litigation on . . . a number of legislative districts."2
According to one media account, the Miller plaintiffs' lawyer
identified "17 house and seven senate districts across the state.
Fourteen of those districts are represented by black lawmakers."2 4
The same account predicted that "[r]edrawing 24 of the 54 mostly
black legislative districts would almost certainly lead to a reduction
in the number of black members of the Legislature."2' By the time it
adjourned, the General Assembly passed new plans deconstructing

215. Johnson v. Mortham, No. 94-40025-MP, 1996 WL 29060 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 4,1996).
216. Diaz v. Silver, No. 95-2591,1995 WL 761845 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,1995).
217. Mark Sherman, Miller Calls Special Session To Redraw Georgia Districts,ATLANTA
J.& CONST., July 7,1995, at Al.
218. Idelson, supra note 209, at 3067.
219. Mark Sherman, Redrawn Districts Expected To Face Challenge, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 2,1995, at B6.
220. Id.
221. Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 1995).
222. Johnson v. Miller, No. 194-008 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 1996).
223. Mark Sherman, 24 Districts Targeted For Court Fight, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July
26, 1995, at C1.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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nine formerly majority-Black districts in the House and two formerly majority-Black districts in the Senate.2m These plans on their face
are retrogressive.w
The former Speaker of the South Carolina House announced
immediately after Miller that "I think it would be fairly easy for any
plaintiff in South Carolina to attack any of the three plans [congressional, House, senate] which have been adopted and prevail." The
three plans, all of which contain majority-Black districts, were
adopted as a result of litigation and section 5 preclearance. 9 It did
not take long for someone to accept the former Speaker's invitation
to litigate. On September 28, 1995, five South Carolina residents,
including a state senator, filed a lawsuit challenging the Senate
redistricting plan. A similar suit challenging the House plan was
filed several months later.u 1
Even consent decrees in section 2 cases are now regarded by
some jurisdictions as vulnerable to Shaw/Miller challenges. In Wilson
v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen, for example, the defendants filed a
motion for relief from the judgment on the grounds that "Miller calls
into question the constitutionality of the apportionment 1lan
adopted by the defendants pursuant to the Consent Judgment."
C. Shaw/Miller: A Double Standard
Shaw and Miller are fairly open to the charge that they embody
an impermissible double standard. m Prior to Shaw, the Court had
never held that a majority-White district, by reason of its shape alone,
was constitutionally suspect.' There is, however, a long and con-

GEORGIA
LAWS
ASSEMBLY-HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
226. GENERAL
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION, at 72 (1995); GENERAL ASSEMBLY-SENATE, GEORGIA LAWS
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION, at 6 (1995).

227. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (describing the principle of
retrogression under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
228. Scoppe, supra note 7, at Al (alteration in original).
229. Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.C. 1993), vacated and remanded sub
nom. SRAC v. Theodore, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993).
230. Smith v. Beasley, Civ. No. 3-95-3235-0 (D.S.C. filed Sept. 28, 1995).
231. Able v. Wilkens, Civ. No. 3-96-3-0 (D.S.C. Filed Jan. 2,1996).
232. Motion for Relief from Judgment at 2, Wilson v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen
(M.D. La. June 22,1995) (No. 92-765-B-1).
233. See Jamin B. Raskin, Gerrymander Hypocrisy; Supreme Court's Double Standard,
NATION, Feb. 6, 1995, at 167 ("Racial double standards are nothing new in American
law, but the Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence has turned farcical.").
234. The Court in Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2823, 2826, relied heavily upon Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), but Gomillion was a Fifteenth Amendment case and the
voting practice it condemned was not a legislative redistricting plan but a racially
discriminatory municipal de-annexation that excluded nearly all of the city's Blacks
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tinuing tradition in America of drawing strangely shaped majorityWhite districts for incumbency protection and other reasons.
District Six in Texas created in the 1960s was known as "Tiger"
Teague's district after the representative of the same name and
"spanned an ungainly rural and urban corridor running from Dallas
to Houston." The old Eighth Congressional District in Louisiana
was "certainly bizarre . . . [and] was crafted for the purpose of
ensuring the re-election of Congressman Gillis Long."2 Oddly
shaped majority-White districts drawn in the 1990s, include District
Four in Tennessee (ninety-six percent White) ("the 4th is a long,
sprawling district, extending nearly 300 miles... from east to west it
touches four States-Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, and
Virginia);,37 District Eleven in Virginia (eighty-one percent White),
which "[has] a shape that vaguely recalls the human digestive
tract";28 District Nine in Washington (eighty-five percent White),
whose "'Main Street' is a sixty-mile stretch of Interstate 5";23
District
Thirteen in Ohio (ninety-four percent White), which "centers around
two distinct sets of communities... [tihe Ohio Turnpike is all that
connects the two"; 4° District Three in Massachusetts (ninety-four
percent White), which was "dubbed the 'Ivy League' district
because it stretches from the town of Princeton in central
Massachusetts to Dartmouth on the southeastern coast. (The schools
by those names are located elsewhere.)., 24 1 Majority-White districts,
no matter how strange their shape, have always been regarded as
immune from challenge under the accepted principle that
compactness was not a constitutional requirement. 24
?2 3 is a stark example of a dual
Vera v. Richards
standard at work
in redistricting post-Shaw. The plaintiffs challenged twenty-four of
Texas' thirty congressional districts, eighteen of which are majority
White.2 The district court invalidated only three districts, the only
two that were majority Black (the Eighteenth and the Thirtieth), and
one that was majority Latino (the Twenty-Ninth). The court

from the electorate. 364 U.S. at 341.
235. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1994), prob. juris. noted sub
nom. Bush v. Vera, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995).
236. Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119,122 (W.D. La. 1994).
237. PoLMcs IN AMERICA, supra note 177, at 1418.
238. Id. at 1602.
239. Id. at 1635.
240. Id. at 1210.
241. Id. at 724.
242. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,752 n.18 (1973).
243. 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
244. Id. at 1309; Brief for Appellant at 2, Lawson v. Vera, 115 S.Ct. 2639 (1995) (No.
94-806).
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admitted that the other districts were irregular or bizarre in shape, 24
but held that they were constitutional because they were "disfigured
less to favor or disadvantage one race or ethnic group than to
promote the re-election of incumbents."' Thus, only oddly shaped
majority-minority districts in Texas were held subject to strict
scrutiny.
Prior to Miller, voting districts were routinely drawn to accommodate the interests of various racial or ethnic groups, e.g., Irish
Catholics in San Francisco, Italian-Americans in South Philadelphia,
Polish-Americans in Chicago, 47 and Anglo-Saxons in North Georgia.
Georgia's Ninth Congressional District, which is ninety-five percent
White, was created in 1980 to preserve in one district the distinctive
White community in the mountain counties. 2* The district was again
drawn as a majority-White district during the 1990 redistricting
process, and for the same reasons as in 1980. A member of the House
Reapportionment Committee acknowledged that the residents "are
predominantly of an Anglo-Saxon bloodline," and the Ninth District
was "drawn purposefully to maintain
it as one district, a[n] area that
'
has a distinct culture and heritage. 24
No court has ever held or suggested that the majority-White
Ninth District was unconstitutional or constitutionally suspect. To
apply a different standard in redistricting to African Americans
based upon speculative assumptions about segregation and harm, as
did the majority in Miller, is to deny African Americans the
recognition given to Whites. It also denies racial minorities the same
opportunities to organize politically that exist as a matter of right for
Whites. To apply a dual standard in redistricting in the name of
colorblindness or the Fourteenth Amendment, whose very purpose
2
was to guarantee equal treatment for Blacks,2 is a stunning irony. 51

245. Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1309 n.4 ("[tlo call these [other challenged] districts
'configured' in any sense that implies order would be a misnomer"). A simple visual
inspection shows, for example, that District Six (89% White) and District Twelve (87%
White) are as, or more, strangely shaped than any of the districts held to be
unconstitutional. Brief for Appellants, Addendum, Comparison of Selected Texas
Congressional Districts, Lawson v. Vera, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995) (No. 94-806).
246. Id. at 1309 (footnote omitted).
247. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2505 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
248. See Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 499 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting that the state
"placed cohesive white communities throughout the State of Georgia into single
Congressional districts... [flor example, the so-called 'mountain counties' of North
Georgia").
249. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Apr. 18, 1994, at 126-27, Johnson
v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (No. 184-008).
250. In the first case construing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court declared
that
[w]e doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
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Justice O'Connor denied that the Constitution "treat[s] efforts to
create majority-minority districts less favorably than similar efforts
on behalf of other groups." ' But in practice there is complete
legislative and judicial tolerance of majority-White districts.
Constitutional suspicion and strict scrutiny have been reserved
exclusively for those that are majority minority.m
VI. REWRITING THE LAW OF SECTION 5

The Court in Miller also substantially rewrote the law
prohibiting local judicial review of the section 5 determinations of
the Attorney General. The district court acknowledged that
"decisions of the Attorney General are not reviewable by this
Court."2' Nonetheless, it directly reviewed the section 5 determination of the Attorney General and held that it was "improper...
because it compelled legislative efforts not reasonably
necessary/narrowly tailored to the written dictates of the Voting
Rights Act.' 'tm According to the district court, "DOJ [Department of
Justice] stretched the VRA [Voting Rights Act] farther than intended
by Congress or allowed by the Constitution."6 Because the Attorney
General was "wrong" in his interpretation of section 5, the State had
"no compelling interest" in complying with the objection."7 The
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision
for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its
application to any other.
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). See Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (a paramount purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was "to overrule explicitly the Dred Scott decision").
251. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions
with DevastatingRacial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1646 (1994) ("[nlow, 120
years after the Slaughter-House Cases, the Fourteenth Amendment may be used to
thwart rather than to assure effective use of the ballot by African Americans").
252. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497.
253. See id.. at 2475 (invalidating Georgia's Eleventh District); Johnson v. Mortham,
Order at 21, No. TCA 94-40025-IMP, 1995 WL 707856, (N.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 1995)
(subjecting Florida's Third District to strict scrutiny); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp.
1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (invalidating Texas' Eighteenth, Twenty-Ninth, and Thirtieth
Districts); Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994) (invalidating Louisiana's
Fourth District). The only congressional districts to withstand challenge are the First
and Twelfth in North Carolina. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994). The
Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in Shaw v. Hunt, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995),
Vera v. Richards, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995), and Bush v. Vera, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995).
254. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354,1383 n.32 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
255. Id. at 1383.
256. Id. at 1383-84 ("DOJ dearly disregarded" applicable Voting Rights Act
regulations).
257. Id. at 1382.

Michigan Journalof Race & Law

[VOL. 1:119

majority also held that "Georgia's current redistricting plan exceeds
what is reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression under section
5." The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the challenged plan
"was not required by the Voting Rights Act under a correct reading
of the statute."'2 9
The Court had previously held that the merits of a section 5
determination were not reviewable by a local federal district court.
In Morris v. Gressette,26 the Court said that no matter how erroneous
the Attorney General's decision not to interpose an objection to a
voting change might be, minority citizens could not bring a civil
action to challenge it. In Morris, moreover, the Attorney General's
failure to object had been based upon a misinterpretation of law
later clarified by the Court, i.e., that in making a section 5 determination the Attorney General was required to defer to a finding by
a district court that a redistricting plan was constitutional.26'
In responding to the dissent's suggestion that an Attorney
General might trade preclearance for the promise of electoral college
votes, Justice Powell's majority opinion in Morris noted that:
"Congress like the courts operates on the assumption that the Attorney General of the United States will perform faithfully his
statutory responsibilities." Justice Powell also rejected even limited
review of the Attorney General's exercise of section 5 authority:
[It was argued] that there should be limited judicial review
only when the Attorney General improperly relinquishes his
responsibilities to evaluate independently the submitted
legislation in light of the standards established by § 5 ....For
the reasons Stated in text, we think Congress intended to preclude
all judicial review of the Attorney General's exercise of discretion or
failure to act.m
Morris recognized, of course, that the Attorney General's
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is not binding upon the
courts mn cases within their jurisdiction.2" It noted that under the Act,
states were free to seek a declaratory judgment from a three-judge

258. Id. at 1384.
259. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491.
260. 432 U.S. 491, 506 n.24 (1977).
261. Id. at 497 & n.8.
262. Id. at 506 n.23.
263. Id. at 507 n.24 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 505; accord Presley v. Etowah County Comms'n, 502 U.S. 491,500 (1992) (a
local three-judge court may determine section 5 coverage independent of the Attorney
General because coverage, as opposed to the merits of a submission, is an issue within
the jurisdiction of a local three-judge court to consider).
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court in the District of Columbia even after an objection from the
Attorney General.2 In such an action, the issue is heard de novo and
decided on the basis of the evidence presented to the court-not
upon an administrative record. The validity of the enactment is
thereby challenged in a traditional constitutional suit, rather than as
a review of the Attorney General's discretion.2 6
In South Carolinav. Katzenbach7 the Court approved the venue
provisions of section 5 as an appropriate exercise of congressional
authority pursuant to Article I,section I of the Constitution.m Congress in the 1970, 1975, and 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights
Act continued to vest the District of Columbia courts and the
Attorney General with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the merits
of section 5 submissions on the grounds that it was necessary to
provide uniform interpretation and application of the Act's standards and269to continue to insure decision making free from local
pressures.
Even where the Attorney General has precleared a voting
change, voters who are aggrieved can still bring a judicial challenge
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.m Again, in such an action
the issue is not the correctness of the Attorney General's decision but
the validity or invalidity of the challenged electoral practice.m
Miller did not overrule Morris v. Gressette-indeed, Miller did
not even mention Morris by name. Since it would violate the Court's
own canons of construction to overrule precedent sub silentio,2
265. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 505 n.21 (1977). See also Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555-56 & n.19 (1969); United States v. Bd. of Supervisors, 429
U.S. 642, 647 (1977).
266. Morris, 432 U.S. at 506-07.
267. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
268. Id. at 331-32. See also Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 385 (1971) ("Congress
expressly reserved [section 5 determinations] for consideration by the District Court for
the District of Columbia or the Attorney General").
269. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 151 (1981) ("[Clentralized review enhances
the likelihood that recurring problems will be resolved in a consistent and expeditious
way."). Congress also limited venue to the District Court for the District of Columbia
for suits by covered jurisdictions seeking a bailout of the preclearance requirements
based in part on the belief that such limitation was "neccessary to provide uniform
interpretation of the bailout standards." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 18, at 58. For a
discussion of the bailout provisions, see McDonald, supra note 27, at 47-53.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994).
271. See, e.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345,351 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (invalidating
under section 2 portions of a legislative redistricting plan precleared by the Attorney
General under section 5), aff'd sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See also
Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D.La. 1983) (rejecting Louisiana's 1982
congressional redistricting that had been precleared by the Attorney General under

section 5).
272. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) ("the careful observer will
discern that any detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred
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Morris must be regarded as binding. It is far from clear, however,
what limitations, if any, in light of Morris, the Court has placed on
local judicial review. Is review reserved only for those exceptional
cases in which deference to the Attorney General would, as the
majority indicated, "raise serious constitutional questions?"m Or is
review appropriate whenever the Attorney General's objection was
not required "under a correct reading of the statute," V4 or if there is
"no reasonable basis" m' for the objection, or if the objection requires
a jurisdiction to do something that is "race-based," e.g., adopt "racebased districting?"27'6 All of these are circumstances under which the
majority indicated review might also be warranted.
If local review in a Miller-type action is available to determine if
there is a "reasonable basis" for an objection, then every objection
would be subject to review for reasonableness. If requiring a jurisdiction to take action that is "race-based" is enough to trigger local
judicial review, then virtually every determination under section 5
would also be reviewable. The Attorney General has no authority
under the statute to object, except on the basis of race (or membership in a language minority).m Thus, anything a jurisdiction might
be required to do as a consequence of an objection would itself be
race-based.
Miller is also ambiguous as to the standard of review to be
applied by a local district court once it exercises jurisdiction. Is
deference required whenever there is a "reasonable basis" for an
objection? Is an objection that requires a jurisdiction to take action
that is "race-based" for that reason "inherently suspect"?278 If so, then
virtually every objection by the Attorney General would be
presumptively unconstitutional.
The majority decision in Miller not only breaches, to an
admittedly unknown extent, the centralized section 5 review process
established by Congress, but it provides an incentive for litigation
and noncompliance with preclearance. Would-be plaintiffs now
have an entirely new cause of action in local federal district courts to
challenge remedies designed to cure section 5 violations on the
ground that the Attorney General's objection was "wrong" or
"unreasonable" or improper under a "correct" reading of the statute.
Covered jurisdictions now have less incentive to comply with
section 5 objections. They know that if they are sued in the local
for articulable reasons").
273. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 2492.
276. Id.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994).

278. Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2492.
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courts for failure to comply they will get judicial review of the
objection and perhaps a decision that the Attorney General's position on the merits "exceeds" her authority.
Moreover, covered jurisdictions, whose historic treatment of
minority voting rights was described by the Supreme Court as one
of "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution, 2 9 can
hardly be expected to vigorously defend lawsuits challenging the
Attorney General's objections to their voting practices under section
5.
The State's half-hearted defense of its congressional
redistricting plan in Miller is a case in point. If such cases are to be
defended adequately, it would likely be by defendant intervenors,
such as minorities in the jurisdiction or the Attorney General. But
requiring minorities to bear the burden of section 5 enforcement
would reverse the regulatory scheme established by Congress which
was "to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators
of the evil [of discrimination in voting] to its victims."
When it extended section 5 in 1982, Congress found that
"[c]ontinued progress toward equal opportunity in the electoral
process will be halted if we abandon the Act's crucial safeguards
now .... The gains are fragile."' ' Those words are equally true
today. By approving local review of the determinations of the
Attorney General, the majority in Miller has substantially weakened
the safeguards of section 5 and broken with the Court's prior
decisions giving the statute "the broadest possible scope" in
combating racial discrimination. 2
A. "Secret Agents" and the ACLU
In reviewing the section 5 objection of the Attorney General, the
district court was sharply critical of the role of the Black Caucus, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the ACLU in the preclearance
process. Members of the legislature who communicated with the
DOJ were labeled as "partisan 'informants"' and "secret agents.'
The court concluded that the State would never have enacted
the Eleventh District "but for DOJ demands."" There was "a direct

279. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,309 (1966).
280. Id. at 328.
281. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 18, at 10.
282. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,567 (1969).
283. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354,1367 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
284. Id. at 1380; see also id. at 1383 (stating that the Eleventh District was designed to
comply with "DOJ's demands"); id. at 1385 (concluding that the Department of Justice
used section 5 "as a tool for forcing" the State to draw majority Black districts).
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link between the 'Max-Black' plan formulated V the ACLU and the
preclearance requirements imposed by DOJ." The "considerable
influence of ACLU advocacy on the voting rights decisions of the
United States Attorney General is an embarrassment. "2 "[U]nfortunate" communications between the DOJ and the ACLU "created
the impression that the ACLU and the Black Caucus wielded
significant influence with DOJ's Civil Rights Division and significant
control over Georgia's redistricting efforts. The State's leaders were
understandably nonplused. The ACLU was exuberant. Georgia
officials and citizens were mystified."
The court's strongest and most emotionally laden condemnation of the Department of Justice was reserved for the hearing on
remand following the decision of the Supreme Court. According to
one member of the district court, "[tihe positions taken by the
Department of Justice... are, in my view, no red herring. They go to
the center of the reason for this litigation. Not a herring at all, but a
Mackerel that is dead on the beach shining and stinking in the
moonlight."'
As the redistricting chronology described above reveals, the
district court's premise that the Department of Justice (with the
connivance of the ACLU) forced the State to create the Eleventh as a
majority-Black district rests in part upon facts that are either
distorted or plainly wrong. The ultimate configuration of the Eleventh District was undeniably influenced by the existence of
alternative redistricting plans, such as the Black Caucus/ACLU and
Senate plans, and by the section 5 objections of the Attorney General.
But just as undeniably, the Eleventh District was conceived and first
enacted as a majority-Black district by the Georgia legislature itself,
prior to any direct intervention by the Attorney General.
Moreover, the Eleventh District as passed by the legislature was
not the Black Caucus/ACLU plan.8 9 As Justice Ginsburg concluded,

285. Id. at 1368.
286. Id.
287. Id. While one may argue whether members of the Black Caucus are in fact
among the state's political "leaders," one cannot deny, as the district court appears to
do, that they are "Georgia officials and citizens" of the State.
288. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 76, at 109-10 (comments of Judge Bowen).
The court's hostility to the preclearance process in Georgia evokes memories of the
bitter dissent from Justice Black in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360
(1966), that section 5 was a humiliating and unwarranted interference with state's rights
and treated the covered southern jurisdictions as "little more than conquered
provinces."
289. As Justice Ginsburg noted, "the 'Max-Black' plan advanced by the Attorney
General was not the plan passed by the Georgia General Assembly." Miller v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475, 2504 (1995). See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1396-97 n.5 (S.D.
Ga. 1994) (Edmondson, J., dissenting) ("The Max-Black plan did influence to some
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the State, not some third party, "chose to adopt the plan here in
controversy."m
The district court's criticism of "partisan 'informants,"' "secret
agents," and the ACLU is a misguided attack upon the Department
of Justice for making a factual investigation of the State's
submissions. The section 5 regulations provide for comments by
persons potentially affected by voting changes.2' The regulations
also allow for persons making comments to request confidentiality.2 9 The purpose of the confidentiality provision is to provide
protection to "people closely associated with the [legislative] decisionmakers and whose livelihoods might be in jeopardy if their
contact with the Department of Justice were to be revealed."'
Because section 5 depends largely on voluntary compliance and
because the DOJ does not have infinite resources with which to
investigate submissions, comments from affected minorities in the
covered jurisdictions are essential to the adequate enforcement of
the statute. The DOJ obviously cannot rely on the submitting jurisdictions to point out ways in which their proposed voting changes
might violate the substantive provisions of section 5. It is difficult to
conceive how section 5 decisionmaking could be reliable if, as the
district court seems to suggest, the Attorney General were permitted
to receive information only from a submitting jurisdiction. Section 5
would become virtually meaningless if racial minorities, for whose
benefit the statute was passed, were barred from communicating
with the Attorney General about proposed voting changes, or if their
communications could be dismissed, as they were by the district
court in Miller, simply as "unfortunate" or an "embarrassment."
VII. MLLER THREATENS TO PURGE MINORrTIES FROM OFFICE

Miller, with its attack on majority-minority districts, threatens to
degree the shape of the ultimate Eleventh District ....[But] the actual Eleventh is not
identical to the Max-Black plan. The Eleventh, to my eye, is significantly different in
shape in many ways.").
290. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2504. See Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1394 n.1 (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting) ("in the end, the plan before us represents the judgment of Georgia's elected
leaders (the main guardians of the public interest for Georgia) on congressional
apportionment').
291. 28 C.F.R. § 51.29 (1995). The issuance of the regulations by the Attorney General
in 1971 was held to be constitutional in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
292. 28 C.F.R. § 51.29(d) (1995) ["The Department of Justice shall comply with the
request of any individual that his or her identity not be disclosed to any person outside
the Department, to the extent permitted by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
552.").
293. Memorandum in Support of United States' Motion for Reconsideration, in Part,
of Order Dated June 6, 1994 at 3, Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(No. 194-008).
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wipe out the gains in minority office-holding in the South achieved
over the last thirty years. Quiet Revolution, a collaborative effort by
twenty-seven political scientists, historians, and lawyers funded by
the National Science Foundation, is by far the most comprehensive
and systematic study to date of the Voting Rights Act.24 It examined
the impact of the Act in eight southern states covered in whole or in
part by the preclearance provisions of section 5. 295 The three principal conclusions of the study are:
First, the increase in the number of Blacks elected to office in
the South is a product of the increase in the number of
majority-Black districts and not of Blacks winning in majorityWhite districts. Second, even today Black populations well
above fifty percent appear necessary if Blacks are to have a
realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice in
the South. Third, the increase in the number of Black districts
in the South is primarily the result not of redistricting changes
based on population shifts as reflected in the decennial census
but, rather, of those required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and its 1982 amendments ....

Federal intervention of this

nature, as well as voting rights suits brought by private
litigants, was primarily responsible for the significant increase
in southern black officeholding ....

VIII. PRIOR STUInEs ARE GENERALLY

296

CoNsISTENT wIT

97

2

THESE FNDINGS

As an illustration of the findings of Quiet Revolution, of the
seventeen African Americans elected to Congress in 1992 and 1994
from the eleven states of the old Confederacy, all were elected from
294. See Pildes, supranote 126, at 1362, noting thatUtterly free of ideological cant, Quiet Revolution presents the most sober,

comprehensive, and significant empirical study of the precise effects of the VRA
ever undertaken.... With its rigorous methodology and systematic approach
Quiet Revolution immediately renders obsolete prior academic, judicial, and media
accounts of the Act that rest on more anecdotal or speculative assertions.
295. McDonald et al., supra note 21, at 17. The states are Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Five
counties in Florida are also covered by section 5, but that state was not included in the
study. No portions of Arkansas or Tennessee, the other two Confederate States, are
covered by section 5. 28 C.F.R. app. § 51 (1995).
296. Handley & Grofman, supra note 148, at 335-36.
297. See M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES
185 (1991); Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority-Group

Representation: A Re-Examination of Historicaland Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL 982
(1981); Bullock, supra note 24, at 1103-04.
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majority-minority districts.28 For minorities to win in these states, it
has generally been necessary for them to run in districts with a
majority-minority population.
The only Black in the twentieth century to win a seat in Congress from a majority-White district in one of the southern States
covered by section 5 was Andrew Young. He was elected in 1972
from the Fifth Congressional District located in the Atlanta metropolitan area and in which Whites constituted over fifty percent of
the population.2 Still, voting was strongly racially polarized and he
got only twenty-five percent of the White vote. In 1990, Young ran
for Governor of Georgia. In both the primary and runoff he again
got about one-fourth of the White vote, but running statewide,
where Blacks made up twenty-seven percent of the population, he
was defeated.m
Abolition of majority-minority districts would likely result in
the elimination of most, if not all, of the African American members
of Congress from the South. The results in the rest of the country
could be almost as dramatic. Of the twenty-two Black members of
the House elected outside the South, only three were elected from
majority-White congressional districts. 3°'
A pattern of minority office-holding similar to that in Congress
exists for southern state legislatures. Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, only about one percent of majority-White districts elected a
Black representative. Blacks who were elected were overwhelmingly
elected from majority-Black districts.3 As of 1988, no Blacks were
elected from majority-White districts in Alabama, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.3
The same pattern that an increase in the number of majorityminority districts increases the number of elected minority officials,
is repeated for southern cities and counties. As noted in Quiet
Revolution:
[We] reaffirm the standard view that at-large elections have
deleterious effects on black representation for cities with white
majorities and a black population of at least 10 percent ....
[D]ramatic gains in black representation followed abolition of
at-large elections-gains much greater than in cities that

298. DAVIS A. Bosms, JOINT CrR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES,
REDISTRICING AND REPRESENTATION: THE CREATION OF MAJORITY-MINORiTY DIsrRICTs
AND THE EVOLVING PARTY SYSTEM IN THE SOuH 14,86 (1995).

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

McDonald et al., supra note 21, at 85.
Id.
Elaine R. Jones, In Peril:Black Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at E19.
Handley & Grofman, supra note 148, at 336-37.
See id. at 346.
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remained at large. (The negative imipact of at-large elections is
felt in county government too .... )
This pattern of minority office-holding, being confined almost
exclusively to highly integrated majority-minority districts in the
South, is the direct result of racially polarized voting patterns that
have prevailed long after the abolition of literacy tests, White
primaries, and the poll tax. Destroying these districts, in the name of
the Fourteenth Amendment, no less, would likely return Georgia
and the South to the days when legislative bodies were largely, or
exclusively, White.3"
CONCLUSION

In 1868, Blacks were elected to the Georgia General Assembly
for the first time in the state's history.306 Thirty-two Blacks were
elected to the General Assembly that year, twenty-nine in the House
and three in the Senate"0 Both houses soon passed resolutions
excluding them on the grounds that they were "ineligible" to serve
under the state constitution" 8 The Speaker of the House ensured
passage of the resolution in the lower chamber by ruling that the
Black members could not vote on the issue of their expulsion.3 0 In an
eerie replay of that history, the Georgia General Assembly some one
hundred years later, acting again upon a supposed constitutional
mandate, i.e., Miller, abolished nine majority-Black House and two
majority-Black Senate districts. And across the South, Blacks and
other racial minorities, with the sanction of the Supreme Court, are
threatened with expulsion from Congress through the systematic
destruction of majority-minority electoral districts. This process of
twentieth-century disfranchisement, evoking as it does the racial

304. Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election
Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra
note 21, at 319.
305. John Lewis, an experienced politician who represents the Fifth Congressional
District in Atlanta, called the current attack on majority-minority districts "the greatest
threat to the Voting Rights Act since it was written in August 6, 1965. If it wasn't for the
Voting Rights Act, it would still be primarily white men in blue suits in Congress."
Laughlin McDonald, Voting Rights and the Court: Drawing the Lines, 15 S. CHANGES, Fall
1993, at 5.
306. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE CREATION OF MODERN GEORGIA 59 (1983).
307. Id. at 61.
308. Id. at 61-62; House Journal, Aug. 26, 1868, at 222; Sept. 3, 1868, at 242-43; Senate
Journal, Sept. 7,1868, at 243-44; Sept. 11, 1868, at 2732-33; Sept. 12, 1868, at 277-78. Four
mulattoes had also been elected to the House and were originally targeted for
expulsion, but they were granted the status of honorary White men and were allowed
to keep their seats. BARTLEY, supra note 306, at 62.
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backlash of the nineteenth century, if unchecked, will inevitably lead
to a purge of minority-elected officials at every level of government.
The consequences for minorities and for the nation as a whole could
be as tragic as they were a hundred years ago.

